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Judging Similarity 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta, & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan 
ABSTRACT: Copyright law’s requirement of substantial similarity requires 
a court to satisfy itself that a defendant’s copying, even when shown to exist 
as a factual matter, is quantitatively and qualitatively enough to render it 
actionable as infringement. By the time a jury reaches the question of 
substantial similarity, however, the court has usually heard and analyzed a 
good deal of evidence about: the plaintiff, the defendant, the creativity 
involved, the process through which the work was created, the reasons for 
which the work was produced, the defendant’s own creative efforts and 
behavior, and, on occasion, the market effects of the defendant’s copying. 
Despite having this large body of evidence before it, the jury is required to 
answer the question of substantial similarity through a mere comparison of 
the two works. In this Essay, we report results from a series of experiments in 
which subjects were presented with a pair of images and asked to assess the 
similarity between the two works using the criteria ordinarily given to fact-
finders for the substantial similarity determination. When provided with 
additional information about the simple fact of copying, or about the amount 
of creative effort that went into the protected work, we saw an appreciable 
variation (i.e., upwards) in subjects’ assessments of similarity between the 
works, suggesting that fact-finders are sensitive to additional information 
about the two works and the creators who produced them, contrary to what 
current law assumes. Our study suggests that the availability and salience of 
such additional information actively distorts fact-finders’ assessments of the 
similarity between the two works, calling into question the purported 
objectivity of the substantial similarity requirement as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fair use is commonly described as copyright law’s “most troublesome” 
doctrine, in large part due to its open-endedness and uncertainty.1 In 
practice, though, the complexities of the fair use doctrine pale in comparison 
to what is central to almost all cases of copyright infringement: the question 
of “substantial similarity.”2 Premised on the idea that “[n]ot all copying . . . is 
copyright infringement,”3 copyright law’s substantial similarity doctrine 
requires a plaintiff to satisfy a court that a defendant’s copying is quantitatively 
and qualitatively enough like the original to render it actionable as 
infringement. The defendant’s copying, in other words, needs to result in a 
copy that is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s protected work for the 
copying to be actionable. 
Determining whether two things are alike may seem like a simple task, 
but the substantial similarity requirement has been besieged by a host of 
problems, most of which derive from the reality that current copyright 
 
 1. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 2. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (noting how it lies at the heart of copyright 
infringement, and yet that there exist “surprising differences” in the working of the doctrine). 
 3. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
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jurisprudence treats it as a fairly straightforward question of fact. Indeed, the 
case that originally developed the requirement described it as merely asking 
whether the defendant’s “copying . . . went so far as to constitute improper 
appropriation,” and mandated that the question be presented to a jury to 
decide.4 The jury is supposed to simply determine whether a defendant’s 
copying rose to the level of an “illicit” or “unlawful” act, through the 
perspective of an “ordinary observer” or “lay listener.”5 In practice, however, 
the structure of the inquiry makes it quite complex. 
In the ordinary sequence of things, the question of substantial similarity 
arises once a plaintiff establishes first that she owns a valid copyright in the 
work, and second that the defendant did in actuality copy from the protected 
work.6 Establishing ownership of the work in turn requires showing both that 
the plaintiff owns the work and that the work itself qualifies for copyright 
protection.7 If the work qualifies for protection and the plaintiff has a valid 
ownership interest in it, the court then looks to evidence on the question of 
whether the defendant actually copied from the protected work. This 
question too is treated as a factual question. It is left to the jury, except that 
the law allows courts to admit the testimony of experts on the creative area in 
question.8 
Consequently, by the time a court reaches the question of substantial 
similarity, the jury has heard and analyzed a good deal of evidence about: the 
plaintiff, the defendant, the creativity involved, the process through which the 
work was created, the reasons for which the work was produced, the 
defendant’s own creative efforts and behavior, and, on occasion, the market 
effects of the defendant’s copying. Although the similarity finding is meant to 
involve no more than a comparison of the two works to assess whether they 
are sufficiently similar to render the copying problematic (i.e., improper), 
that judgment may be affected by the availability of this other evidence. The 
fact-finder—a court during a bench trial or the jury ordinarily—is required to 
answer the question of substantial similarity through a mere comparison of 
the two works, which will often involve actively ignoring intuitively relevant 
and highly salient information. Copyright law thus seems to assume that the 
question of substantial similarity can continue to remain a simple comparison 
of the two works, even in the face of extensive factual evidence that bears 
directly on the dispute in question. The fact-finder is presumed to be able to 
cabin and exclude from the analysis all of the evidence with which the court 
has been presented in the lead-up to the issue of substantial similarity. 
 
 4. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 5. Id. at 472–73; see also Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 6. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (2014) 
[hereinafter NIMMER]. 
 7. Id. § 13.01(A). 
 8. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469 (noting that copying “is an issue of fact”). 
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In examining this sequence of steps, one scholar of copyright law has thus 
characterized the substantial similarity inquiry as being “bizarre” and as 
making “no sense.”9 It relegates to the fact-finder questions that require 
nuanced understandings not only of the artistic context, but also of the legal 
framework—the kinds of questions that in other areas of the law are typically 
answered by experts.10 One of us has further suggested that the substantial 
similarity question, given its place in the overall sequence of the infringement 
inquiry, is likely to be influenced by a variety of cognitive biases brought by 
the fact-finder.11 Indeed, there is even an argument that these kinds of 
normative judgments may be inevitable, and that copyright law ought to 
embrace the normative element of substantial similarity. Recognizing that the 
comparison of similarity is an intrinsically subjective exercise, where the fact-
finder is exercising a moral judgment on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
actions using non-utilitarian variables, the substantial similarity test may take 
on an entirely different, but more practicable meaning. In this study, we test 
these insights about the similarity determination using a series of 
experiments. 
In other contexts, scholars have known for a long time that ignoring 
salient information is a very difficult cognitive task.12 Jurors are frequently 
called upon to disregard evidence (e.g., marital fault in a custody hearing) or 
to avoid a natural and even accurate inference (e.g., that arrest is predictive 
of guilt). Instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence have been under fire 
for years, and rightly so—there is a substantial body of evidence showing that 
not only is the information hard to ignore, but that the instruction to ignore 
can actually have a backlash effect and make the information all the more 
salient. 
The cognitive task implicated by the substantial similarity instruction is 
somewhat more complex, which is perhaps why it has received less 
experimental attention. The instruction is not specifically about excluding 
salient information, but rather about cabining the inquiry to essentially 
perceptual stimuli. In some ways, this may explain the psychological naiveté 
of the rule; we might be inclined to think that the task is more about visual or 
aural perceptions rather than judgments, and that perception is less subject 
to contamination. In fact, though, over one hundred years of psychology has 
shown us various examples of “contaminated” perceptions. Extraneous 
information can affect the perception of the length of the line on a 
 
 9. Lemley, supra note 2, at 719. 
 10. Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1336–46 (2012). 
 11. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 
242 (2012).  
 12. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich, et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty 
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (2005). 
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chalkboard,13 the events of a football game,14 or the appearance of a dancing 
gorilla on a computer screen.15 Our hypothesis then is that similarities will 
seem more similar, and dissimilarities less obvious, when the judgment is 
embedded in a narrative that not only describes the intentional act of making 
one thing look like another, but that also identifies a wrongdoer. 
The two new experimental studies we present below are a first pass at 
identifying the role of extrinsic evidence in judgments of substantial 
similarity. The studies have a very straightforward design. In each, we ask 
subjects to look at a pair of images and report how similar the images are. In 
a control condition, they have minimal extrinsic information. In the 
experimental condition, they have an additional fact about the act of copying, 
the creation of the work, or the consequences of the copying. To preview the 
results, we found that when provided with additional information about the 
simple fact of copying or the creative effort that went into the protected work, 
we saw an appreciable upward shift in subjects’ assessments of similarity 
between the works. This was the case despite the fact that the works remained 
the same and the subjects were consistently told that they had to base their 
assessments entirely on the works themselves. 
Our results suggest that fact-finders are sensitive to additional 
information about the two works and the creators who produced them, much 
along the lines predicted by the critics of the substantial similarity analysis. We 
posit two mechanisms to explain these results: one based on how the 
information might affect the allocation of attentional resources and the other 
based on how information might motivate a particular judgment of similarity. 
Part I begins with an overview of copyright law’s process of determining 
copying and the role that substantial similarity plays therein. It first describes 
the current state of the law (Part I.A) and identifies obvious problems that the 
literature points to within it (Part I.B), which form the claims that our study 
investigates. Part II then describes the experimental design of our study, the 
methodology used, and the results that we obtained. Part III explains what 
these results mean for copyright law and the infringement inquiry. 
 
 13. S. E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in 
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177–90 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 1951). 
 14. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954) (describing a study that shows that people’s perception of a football 
game was dependent on the way different journalists described the game). 
 15. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional 
Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999) (discussing an experiment that shows 
that people are blind to unexpected objects and occurences even when a man in a gorilla suit is 
playing basketball on a screen). 
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I. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. THE TEST 
Copyright owners’ exclusive rights are described in 17 U.S.C. § 106, and 
include the rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, 
and digitally transmit the work as well as to prepare derivative works.16 To 
show that copyright infringement has occurred, an owner has to show that she 
owns a copyright and that at least one of the rights listed in section 106 has 
been violated.17 Ownership is generally not the critical issue, but rather the 
existence of a violation is. When the claim consists of an alleged unauthorized 
reproduction of the work, the plaintiff has to show that her work was copied.18 
Either direct or indirect evidence can be used to prove copying.19 If two works 
are similar enough, they are said to be strikingly similar, and proof of access 
to the original work can be inferred on that basis.20 Courts have recognized 
the principle that if access to the original work and a certain level of similarity 
between works are present, the most logical inference is that copying did 
indeed take place.21 Not all copying is actionable, however. For example, 
copying only small amounts of original expression from a work or copying 
only elements that are also in the public domain is legal. Copyright law seeks 
to prohibit substantial copying, which can result in a complex determination.22 
While various circuits have adopted slightly different tests to determine 
the existence of copyright infringement, many of them fundamentally follow 
the approach of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed 
in Arnstein v. Porter.23 The songwriter Ira Arnstein accused his colleague Cole 
Porter of appropriating Arnstein’s work for a number of successful songs.24 
The court created a two-step test that requires: (1) evidence of access and 
similarities sufficient to demonstrate that copying has taken place; and (2) a 
 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470–71 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 19. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003); Repp v. 
Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d. Cir. 1997). 
 20. See, e.g., Repp, 132 F.3d at 889. “[T]he stronger the proof of similarity, the less the proof 
of access that is required.” NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(D). See generally Alan Latman, “Probative 
Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1187 (1990) (encouraging the use of probative similarity as part of the standard of proof 
for copyright infringement cases). 
 21. Lemley, supra note 2, at 720–21. 
 22. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(A). 
 23. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946). For an in-depth description of 
the different tests used across the country, see ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, 
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3.1–.4 (2004). 
 24. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467–68. Ira Arnstein had a long history of launching copyright 
infringement lawsuits. See generally GARY A. ROSEN, UNFAIR TO GENIUS: THE STRANGE AND 
LITIGIOUS CAREER OF IRA B. ARNSTEIN (2012).  
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showing that the copying was illicit and amounts to unlawful appropriation.25 
Unlike for the first step, no expert evidence or dissection of the work is 
permitted for the second step; rather, courts test the perception of the 
ordinary observer on this matter.26 In the Arnstein litigation, this meant that 
the court wanted to know for the second step “whether defendant took from 
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who 
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the 
plaintiff.”27 While the Arnstein court specified the importance of gauging the 
sentiments of the relevant audience, today only the Fourth Circuit explicitly 
emphasizes that aspect while other circuits tend to speak of the ordinary or 
reasonable observer more generically.28 
The Ninth Circuit, which has also implemented a two-step test, takes a 
slightly different approach from the Second Circuit to the issue of substantial 
similarity. It introduced its test in the case Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. and differentiates between a first 
“extrinsic” step and a second “intrinsic” step.29 The extrinsic step establishes 
probative similarity by determining the similarity of ideas with the help of 
experts and analytic dissection.30 The intrinsic step compares the response of 
the ordinary reasonable person to the expressions in the two works without 
the use of experts or dissection.31  The Ninth Circuit later sought to clarify its 
approach in Shaw v. Lindheim, explaining that the extrinsic step was essentially 
an objective test while the intrinsic step was a subjective test.32 Courts 
following the Shaw test, however, have introduced quite a bit of confusion by 
failing to differentiate between “what the jury subjectively experiences with 
what the hypothetical ordinary observer himself would perceive.”33 As a 
related matter, the jury instructions in these contexts show great 
heterogeneity and frequently fail to distinguish whose perception the legal 
test and hence the jury should seek to ascertain.34 
 
 25. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 473. 
 28. See generally Manta, supra note 10, at 1350–51 (critiquing the reasonable man standard 
presented to jurors and advocating instead for a subjective standard that focuses on the intended 
audience and social science surveys to show infringement). There is variation on this, with some 
courts willing to make exceptions if the reasonable observer of a work is far apart from the average 
juror. See, e.g., Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 29. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 
(9th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).  
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 33. Manta, supra note 10, at 1335.  
 34. See id. at 1335–36. 
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In presenting the question of similarity to a jury, the substantial similarity 
tests used in every circuit provide surprisingly little direction on precisely how 
the comparison is to be carried out. Most courts agree that the comparison 
needs to be conducted holistically, taking into account the work as a whole. 
Courts describe this as the “total concept and feel”35 approach to comparing 
the works, or as the “overall look and feel” approach.36 The comparison is thus 
meant to avoid focusing on individual components of the work that might 
emphasize the dissimilarities over the similarities.37 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits, the primary developers of the 
substantial similarity standard, additionally insist that the test involves both a 
quantitative and a qualitative dimension.38 The quantitative dimension entails 
examining whether the copying crossed a de minimis threshold.39 The 
qualitative element on the other hand is meant to investigate the value and 
significance of the copying against the backdrop of the plaintiff’s whole work. 
In other words, it is meant to scrutinize whether the defendant appropriated 
aspects of the protected work that are particularly valuable and significant.40 
Beyond general abstract statements that “[y]ou must consider the 
qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied portions in relation to 
the work as a whole,” and that the question is whether “compared to the work 
as a whole the average audience would not recognize the appropriation,” the 
test provides little additional instruction to the jury on the process through 
which it is meant to carry out the comparison.41 One court thus openly 
characterized the assessment of similarity as “virtually devoid of analysis” since 
it involves “a mere subjective judgment” on whether the “two literary works 
are or are not similar.”42 Other courts have additionally indicated that the 
reaction of the ordinary observer that the jury is meant to consider must “be 
spontaneous and immediate,” which adds a further air of subjectivity and 
apparent impulsiveness to the similarity comparison.43 Given this reality, no 
federal court of appeal today provides district courts with model jury 
 
 35. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Hobbs v. John, 722 F.3d 1089, 1094–95 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 
1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Balganesh, supra note 11, at 227. 
 38. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. 
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1376–77 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 39. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 23, § 2:4.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Final Charge to Jury and Special Verdict Form at 14, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
750 F.3d 1339 (2014) (No. C 10-03561 WHA), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/Ora 
Google-1018.pdf. 
 42. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 43. Peel & Co., Inc. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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instructions on the question of substantial similarity. While the Ninth Circuit 
initially attempted to do so, it eventually withdrew its model instructions. The 
court’s following observation speaks to the abstract and intuitive nature of the 
test when translated into practice: 
The committee concluded that the general statement of the 
test embodied in the former instruction was not helpful in 
light of the diverse facts that might arise at trial pertinent to 
a substantial similarity assessment. The committee also 
concluded that the court and counsel would be best served 
by specifically crafting instructions in this area based upon 
the particular work(s) at issue, the copyright in question, and 
the evidence developed at trial.44 
B. THE PROBLEM 
The exact process of scrutiny that a fact-finder is supposed to undertake 
in applying the substantial similarity analysis remains unclear. Not only does 
the court/jury conducting the inquiry do so after being presented with 
evidence about the protected work, the plaintiff’s efforts in creating it, and 
the defendant’s own actions in copying, but the contours of the standards 
guiding the inquiry itself are also grossly imprecise and fuzzy. In practice, 
therefore, the substantial similarity analysis remains a virtual black box. To 
date, scholars have only speculated on how courts and juries are likely to go 
about applying the test given these realities. 
We start by unpacking the substantial similarity task put to the fact-finder. 
There are two parts to this task. The first is a general attempt to determine 
what is the same and what is different between two works. This seems easy at 
first; it is literally child’s play in the old Sesame Street “One of these Things 
(Is Not Like the Others)” song.45 But think of how overwhelming the task 
would actually be, if broken down into its sub-steps, to try to iterate all the 
ways in which two images, for example, are different. Should we go pixel-by-
pixel? What about stylistic similarities, or thematic similarities? There is a lot 
of information through which to sort, and a number of similarity “facts” 
necessarily recruit other kinds of background knowledge. 
Of course, even if one could make such a list in a sensible way, there is a 
second part of the task, which is deciding whether the identified similarities 
are enough, collectively, to constitute “substantial” similarity. Depending on 
one’s view, “substantial” could reasonably mean anything from “non-trivial” 
to “more than not” or even “highly.” For the purposes of this paper, we leave 
aside differential understandings of the standard of substantiality and focus 
 
 44. GEORGE H. KING ET AL., NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., NINTH CIRCUIT, 
MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 17.17 (2007) (withdrawn). 
 45. BOB & SUSAN, One of These Things, on SESAME STREET: THE SESAME STREET ANNIVERSARY 
ALBUM (Sesame Street Records 1979).  
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entirely on perceptions of similarity. But, as we have argued, those judgments 
alone are complex enough to implicate some of the findings from the 
bounded rationality literature. When a judgment task is difficult, people often 
rely on shortcuts or heuristics and are more likely to be swayed by salient 
factors to the exclusion of other important, but more nuanced 
considerations.46 
As such, our investigation begins with the proposition that the substantial 
similarity test requires jurors and judges to work through a complex and ill-
defined cognitive task, and is therefore vulnerable to biased reasoning. In 
previous work, one of us has argued that as a normative matter, the abstract 
and open-ended nature of the similarity analysis should be used by courts to 
infuse copyright law with deontic and other moral considerations as part of 
their analysis of similarity.47 The assessment of similarity in this conception is 
seen “as a proxy for the wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions” when 
measured against the backdrop of the plaintiff’s creative endeavors.48 
Building on the notion of correlativity49 that originates in the ideal of 
corrective justice, this argument suggested that during the similarity inquiry, 
“the defendant’s actions are examined through the lens of a right-duty 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.”50 The fact-finder is thus 
presumed to be examining how the defendant’s act of appropriating 
substance and value from the protected work interferes with the author-work 
connection that is a central part of the plaintiff-creator’s agency/autonomy, 
and which copyright law might implicitly be seen as protecting.51 Underlying 
this theory was the notion that courts (as fact-finders in the inquiry) were 
using a legal standard (i.e., substantial similarity) to give effect to their moral 
intuitions about the actions and parties involved, a feature of decision-making 
in different contexts that another one of us has explored empirically using 
methods from moral psychology.52 Moral considerations, specifically those 
relating to the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions and the theory 
suggested, both do and should remain the focus of the similarity analysis, 
 
 46. For a discussion of how decision-making for ambiguous tasks suffers a greater risk of 
falling prey to cognitive biases, see Manta, supra note 10, at 1339–40. 
 47. Balganesh, supra note 11, at 228. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Correlativity refers to the idea that one actor’s doing and another’s suffering are 
normatively related to each other, which in turn triggers the need for a restoration of the original 
equilibrium. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 417 (1992) (“In 
corrective justice, . . . the unity of the plaintiff-defendant relationship lies in the very correlativity 
of doing and suffering harm.”). 
 50. Balganesh, supra note 11, at 251. 
 51. Id. at 254. 
 52. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in 
Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan 
Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault 
Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315 (2008). 
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which copyright law would do well to openly acknowledge and embrace in its 
pluralistic structure.53 
In other work, another one of us has examined the working of substantial 
similarity to suggest that its structure renders the inquiry open to a variety of 
cognitive biases. For example, we might think that the fact that a defendant 
has copied paints him as a bad actor, which thus colors the rest of the 
judgments required to find liability, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 
a “reverse halo effect.”54 Or the knowledge of copying may affect how jurors 
search for information about similarity, tending to push them to look for 
evidence of copying guided by confirmation bias.55 And, of course, decision-
makers in this context are working with the benefits of hindsight, which we 
know is very hard to ignore. While scholars have in the past acknowledged the 
presence of hindsight bias in the working of copyright law, the substantial 
similarity analysis is perhaps most susceptible to its pitfalls, given that the fact-
finder is asked to undertake the similarity analysis after evidence of actual 
copying is presented, and indeed a decision as to that question has already 
been made.56 This work thus hypothesized that “a legal decisionmaker may 
draw conscious or subconscious conclusions from a determination of copying, 
which will increase the chance that he or she will make a finding of substantial 
similarity.”57 This suggestion comports with the moral intuition described 
previously, since it also presumes that the decision-maker implicitly or 
explicitly disfavors “free-riding” as an intuitive matter. The decision-maker 
may thus come to incorporate this moral intuition into the similarity analysis 
and fail to disregard any evidence of copying.58 
Decision-makers’ use of moral judgments in contexts where the law 
deems moral considerations altogether irrelevant has shown to be an 
unavoidable reality in some areas. In particular, this has been demonstrated 
in the contract law setting, where the law treats breach of contract as premised 
on strict liability.59 Despite the fact that a defendant’s “fault” or morally 
wrongful behavior is meant to play no role in determining breach or in 
computing expectation damages, decision-makers invariably factor that into 
their decisions.60 Moral intuitions often influence the analysis of an objective 
legal standard. 
 
 53. Balganesh, supra note 11, at 249–57.  
 54. Manta, supra note 10, at 1338–45 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 1339; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1631–32 (2009). 
 57. Manta, supra note 10, at 1340. 
 58. Id. at 1339–40.  
 59. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 669–71 (2010); see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral 
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, supra note 52. 
 60.  See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 
supra note 52.  
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We should expect to see a similar reliance on moral intuitions about the 
wrongfulness of copying influencing decision-makers’ conclusions on 
substantial similarity, even though their analysis is meant to operate as a 
simple comparison of the two works. The wrongfulness of such copying might 
arise from their moral views on copying as such and from a variety of extrinsic 
considerations that they might see as influencing its wrongfulness. These may 
include the value and extent of the creator’s labor, the connection between 
the work and its creator, the market effects of the copying, and the copier’s 
bad-faith behavior. If the similarity analysis is in reality influenced by these 
considerations, the simplistic observation that liability for copyright 
infringement is in the end “strict” would seem to be at least partially untrue,61 
and we may want to consider whether and how the law ought to take this into 
account. 
The only previous work to have examined the working of substantial 
similarity through the use of behavioral experiments has sought to do so in 
the context of music, where the test is meant to examine the reactions of “lay 
listeners.”62 Since copyright law protects both compositional and 
performance-based elements, the study shows that decision-makers are unable 
to separate the two when asked to undertake the substantial similarity analysis 
in relation only to one.63 The study thus found that “playing an audio 
recording invites the juror to make the wrong comparison by comparing the 
sound recordings rather than the compositional elements underlying each 
recording.”64 This preliminary study thus suggests that our intuition is correct 
that the substantial similarity decision does indeed harbor a variety of external 
and potentially irrelevant considerations. In this paper, we therefore develop 
a series of experiments to examine whether and to which extent decision-
makers carrying out a similarity analysis employ their intuitive moral 
judgments about copying to decide the question. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS AND RESULTS 
The studies we report here have a straightforward structure. Using online 
surveys, we asked participants to make judgments about the similarity of 
images presented in pairs, varying the information about the creation or 
copying status of the images experimentally. Subjects made these judgments 
using a numerical scale and were told that they were only to take into account 
the images themselves. This means that subjects were not actually making an 
explicit judgment about substantiality; they were only rating similarity. We 
 
 61. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong 
of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1682–84 (2012). 
 62. Jamie Lund, An Empirical Examination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composition Copyright 
Infringement, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137 (2011). 
 63. Id. at 175. 
 64. Id. at 139. 
E1_BALGANESH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  3:16 PM 
2014] JUDGING SIMILARITY 279 
used subjects drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk, a commonly used 
mechanism for recruiting participants in survey experiments.65 
A. STUDY 1 
1. Methods 
In the first study, we tested the hypothesis that images seem more similar 
simply by virtue of being copies. Subjects were recruited on Amazon Turk and 
then directed to a study programmed using the survey software Qualtrics. 
Each subject was paid one dollar for completing the five-minute 
questionnaire. 
Subjects read the following instruction before seeing the image pairs: 
In the scenarios that follow, you will be presented with pairs of works 
and asked to examine the extent to which you consider them to be 
similar to each other. You will be asked to indicate your response on 
a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the least similar and 7 being the most 
similar. 
In examining the similarity between the two works, please use the 
following guidelines: 
You must base your answers (on the similarity between the works) 
entirely on a comparison of the works themselves. 
There will no doubt be similarities and dissimilarities between 
different parts of the two works. You must determine the extent to 
which, as an observer of the works, you would regard them—as a 
whole—as similar to one another. 
Please assume that the works on the left were created before the 
works on the right. 
Subjects were then randomly assigned to either the independent group 
or the copy group. After reading the initial instructions, subjects saw the first 
in a series of eight pairs of images. The order of image pairs was random. 
Before answering the similarity question, subjects received information about 
copying. Subjects in the independent group read, “Please assume that the 
creator of the work on the right did not know about the work on the left 
during the process of creation.” Subjects in the copy group read, “Please 
assume that the creator of the work on the right copied from the work on the 
left during the process of creation.” Note that this means that a given subject 
 
 65. See generally Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments 
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010).   
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saw all images in one condition or the other. An example of the image pairs 
is pictured below.66 
 
Figure 1. Image Pair for the “Rug 2” Item 
 
2. Results 
Of the 152 subjects who participated, 58.9% were female. Subjects’ ages 
ranged from 19 to 70, with a median age of 31. 
This study tested the effect of information about copying on assessments 
of similarity. As such, our first test was whether, in the aggregate, subjects in 
the copy group found the image pairs more similar than subjects in the 
independent group. They did. The mean rating of similarity in the 
independent group was 4.28, and the mean rating of similarity in the copy 
group was 4.61. This difference is highly significant (W=2179, p=.009).67 As 
is clear from Table 1 below, the effect size varied significantly by image. Rug 
2 and Rug 3 are the only image pairs that showed significant differences by 
condition when tested separately. Even when those images are removed from 
 
     66.    We sought to include all the images used in the published version of this paper. The 
Iowa Law Review prohibited us from doing so, on advice of legal counsel, due to concerns over 
copyright infringement liability. We vehemently disagree with this decision and believe that 
including the images would have been clearly allowed under the doctrine of fair use. We will 
make a version of the paper with all images included available to anyone who contacts us. 
 67. We use a two-sided, non-parametric test of differences here. A non-parametric test does 
not assume normal distribution of the data. It is a more conservative test of significance than, for 
example, a t-test. A two-sided test is also somewhat conservative in this case, insofar as our 
prediction is one-sided—we are predicting, in both studies, that additional information about 
copying will make the images appear more similar, not just different.  
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the aggregate analysis, however, the effect of condition remains marginally 
significant even using a two-way non-parametric test (W=2392.5, p=.068). 
 
Table 1. Mean Similarity Ratings by Condition 
 
 Independent Copy
American Gothic 4.84 4.83 
Father 4.69 5.03 
Accordion 4.10 4.43 
Pen Grid 4.45 4.71 
New Yorker 3.64 3.85 
Rug 1 3.92 4.15 
Rug 2 4.08 4.65 
Rug 3 3.51 4.20 
 
Overall, these results strongly suggest that the similarity judgment is 
affected by the mere fact of knowledge of copying. 
With this experiment, we are unable to distinguish among the possible 
mechanisms of this effect. We can imagine two primary explanations for this 
phenomenon. The first is essentially an attentional explanation—once a 
person is told that an image is copied, the similarities may be easier to find. 
Assessing similarity may become a kind of exercise in confirmation bias. The 
second explanation is one of motivated reasoning. That is, people may find 
copying morally distasteful and import their preference to punish the copier 
into their judgment of similarity. 
In this particular study, the first explanation is compelling because 
subjects did not actually have information about the consequences of the 
similarity judgment. They may have assumed that more similarity would lead 
to greater liability, but we do not know how they understood the relationship 
between similarity and liability from this experiment alone. Given the 
relatively sparse legal and moral context of the judgment task we presented 
to subjects here, the attentional explanation is particularly plausible. 
With Study 2, we brought more legal context to the decision task in order 
to specifically judge the effect of morally relevant information on judgments 
of similarity. We explored the kinds of intuitions or biases that may affect 
judgments of similarity by selectively introducing two types of salient facts 
about the creation process to subjects in one of the experimental groups. 
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B. STUDY 2 
In the second study, we tested two hypotheses that are specifically about 
how moral intuitions about the unfairness of copying might affect judgments 
of similarity. We tested the effect of information about high versus low effort 
invested by the original creator. We separately tested the effect of information 
about negative versus no change in market demand for the original since the 
copy became available. Though the general method is the same, in this study 
we therefore introduced the similarity task with some context for the similarity 
judgment. To the extent that the similarity judgment is motivated by moral 
intuitions, the motivation derives from the knowledge that findings of greater 
similarity are more likely to result in punishment for the copier and/or 
compensation for the wronged creator. 
This study used a single image pair in hopes of eliciting a clean response 
to a single image pair, as a jury would do in a trial. 
1. Methods 
We had two hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that subjects would find 
the images more similar when the original was labor-intensive than when the 
original had required little labor to create. The second hypothesis was that 
subjects would find the images more similar when the copying had a negative 
economic impact on the original creator than when the copying had no 
economic impact on the original creator. 
All subjects read the following instructions: 
You will be asked to read a set of instructions that are typically shown 
to juries in copyright infringement cases where the court is trying to 
determine whether or not to impose liability on someone who has 
copied another person’s copyrighted work. A court that does find 
liability will either require that the copier pay money damages to the 
original creator and/or require that the copier stop copying. 
When a court considers a copyright infringement claim, it asks the 
jury to determine whether an original work and a copied work are 
“substantially similar.” If the works are not substantially similar, there 
is no copyright infringement and thus no liability for the copier, 
even if the copier did in fact copy from the original work. 
In the scenarios that follow, you will be presented with a pair of works 
and asked to examine the extent to which you consider them to be 
similar to each other. You will be asked to indicate your response on 
a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the least similar and 10 being the 
most similar. In examining the similarity between the two works, 
please use the following guidelines: 
You must base your answers (on the similarity between the works) 
entirely on a comparison of the works themselves. 
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There will no doubt be similarities and dissimilarities between 
different parts of the two works. You must determine the extent to 
which, as an observer of the works, you would regard them—as a 
whole—as similar to one another. 
In this case, assume that the work on the left is the original and the 
work on the right is the copy.68 
This study was entirely between-subjects. Each subject made a single 
judgment about the similarity of the images. Each subject was assigned 
randomly to one of four conditions: high labor, low labor, market effect, or 
no market effect. For each condition, each subject was informed as follows: 
High-Labor Condition: “The creator of the original spent about two 
months designing and setting up the shot to get this photograph.” 
Low-Labor Condition: “The creator of the original spent about ten 
minutes designing and setting up the shot to get this photograph.” 
Market Effect Condition: “Since the copy has become available, it 
has had a strong negative effect on demand for prints and licenses 
of the original. Sales of the original (digital and print) are down by 
over 60% since the copy came on the market.” 
No Market Effect Condition: “Since the copy has become available, 
it has had no effect on demand for prints and licenses of the original. 
Sales of the original (digital and print) have not changed since the 
copy came on the market.” 
2. Results 
Of the 493 subjects recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, 66.1% were 
female. Subjects’ ages ranged from 18 to 66, with a median of 28. They were 
paid 50¢ to complete a two-minute task. One hundred and forty-one subjects 
were assigned to either one of the market substitution conditions; 352 
subjects were assigned to either one of the labor conditions.69 
Subjects who saw the high-labor condition rated the photographs as more 
similar than subjects who saw the low-labor condition. The median similarity 
rating for the high-labor condition was 8; it was 7 for the low-labor condition. 
The mean difference was .50 on a ten-point scale (7.2 versus 6.7), which is a 
significant difference (W=13,440.5, p=.030). To get a sense of how this shift 
might show up in real life, it helps to think of it in terms of percentages. As 
we show in the table below, there is a real downward shift (of about 8.5%) in 
the number of subjects who find the images relatively dissimilar (below the 
 
     68.     See supra Figure 1 for example of an image pair. 
 69. The uneven distribution across hypotheses was deliberate and used essentially as a cost-
saving measure. After we obtained the first set of results, it was clear that the market substitution 
item showed no differences, so we removed it to increase the power of the test of the labor 
manipulation. 
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midpoint, 5, on the scale), and a concomitant upward shift in the subjects 
who find the images nearly identical (9 or 10 on a ten-point scale). 
 
Table 2. 
 Low Labor High Labor 
Mean 6.71 7.21 
Median 7 8 
% Reporting 
Dissimilarity (1–5) 25.9% 17.4% 
% Reporting Similarity 
(9–10) 20.1% 28.7% 
 
 There was no effect of information about market substitution (W=2567, 
p=.970). 
III. DISCUSSION 
These studies yielded two major results. The first is that mere knowledge 
of copying has the tendency to make works seem more similar. The second is 
that, even when the fact of copying is established, information about the 
original creator’s personal labor investment in the work affects perceptions of 
similarity, where the copy of a high-labor work is rated as more similar to the 
original than the copy of a low-labor original work. 
Before we begin to think about the explanations and implications of 
these results, we draw some basic inferences related to the study design. First, 
there are obviously differences between assessing similarity in an online survey 
and in a courtroom. It is probably safe to assume that in a court, jurors and 
judges invest significantly more time and energy in their judgments. And, in 
a court, the information context is much richer and more complicated. Jurors 
know a lot about the works by the time they are being asked to assess similarity, 
and it is possible that the sheer volume of information could dwarf the effect 
of a single fact about the creator’s labor investment. 
Though we acknowledge the challenges to generalizing the results of 
these studies to the real-world context, we think there is reason to find these 
studies somewhat less problematic from an external validity standpoint than 
other questionnaire studies. In essence, here, the task is actually nearly 
identical to the task of judges and jurors in a copyright infringement action—
they are asked to look at two images and decide how similar they are. Indeed, 
we would argue that these results may actually be quite conservative, insofar 
as there is no overwhelmingly salient information about an aggrieved and 
sympathetic creator or blatantly self-interested copier. The language used in 
these studies is fairly terse and neutral, which presumably distinguishes it from 
the kinds of evidence that would be presented at trial. 
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A. PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS FOR DISTORTED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 
While the risk of cognitive bias in the copyright infringement test has 
been recognized by scholars a number of times, our experiment provides 
definitive evidence of its existence. Two types of biases may help to explain 
the results of the first study: attentional biases and motivational biases. 
An attentional bias describes a person’s tendency to focus on some 
information and ignore other information in a manner that does not reflect 
the relative importance of the information for the particular inquiry. We can 
think of this class of bias as being essentially about salience—a focus on stimuli 
or attributes that easily capture our attention, for one reason or another. 
Because the inquiry is framed in terms of similarity and not difference, the 
tendency may be to search for similarities rather than differences. It is 
unsurprising in this context that knowledge of copying would exacerbate such 
a bias because knowledge of copying makes the possibility of similarities more 
salient, and the subject will actively search for them. This phenomenon is 
referred to as a “confirmation bias”—the preferential search for information 
that is congruent with one’s hypothesis rather than the more valuable search 
for information that would falsify. This explanation is particularly apt in the 
copying context because what we understand copying to be about is making 
things similar. Anchoring is also an attentional bias—lack of attention to 
updates to a baseline assessment or belief. Here, subjects may have 
“anchored” on the notion that copied images would be highly similar, and 
then failed to fully adjust to account for the actual differences in the images.70 
Overall, increased focus on similarities, knowing that the similarities are 
intentional, should not be especially surprising.71 
Nonetheless, it is less plausible to think that this kind of attentional bias 
can explain what is happening in the second study. Why would knowledge of 
the creator’s painstaking labor make similarities to the copy more salient and 
dissimilarities less salient, especially when the fact of copying is disclosed in 
both the high and low labor conditions? The goal of the second study was to 
get at a second explanation for how similarity judgments may be distorted by 
extrinsic evidence about the creator and the copier. 
The second type of bias that the study may be capturing is a form of 
motivated reasoning grounded in morality considerations.72 Motivated 
reasoning is a broad category of biases that might be thought of as wishful 
 
 70. For more discussion of anchoring, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: 
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 751 n.60 (2000). See 
generally Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be Able to 
Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667 (2013).  
 71. This would be in line with what one of us predicted in previous work. See Manta, supra 
note 10, at 1343–44.  
 72. Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 101 (2013) (explaining that 
motivated reasoning broadly refers to the tendency to “look for sources to support what we 
already think we know”). 
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thinking. The idea is that sometimes people who try to make objective 
judgments find that their reasoning and inferences are biased toward answers 
that favor their underlying beliefs and preferences. So, in this case, if copying 
seems unfair, and copying someone else’s hard work even more unfair, we 
may see increased similarity judgments because subjects and/or jurors are 
implicitly motivated by the prospect of liability for a bad actor. While legally 
insufficient to determine a proper finding of infringement, accusations of 
copying alone conjure negative images of plagiarism and cheating, and 
hence, the copier is by his nature seen as an unsavory character.73 Defendants’ 
lawyers may have trouble dispelling this image, especially when plaintiffs’ 
attorneys will do all they can to encourage juries to think of copying and 
similarity in the same context.74 
Unlike in a trial setting, where the facts in copyright cases greatly differ 
from one situation to another, our first study enabled us to isolate the copying 
element. Nothing changed between the two conditions aside from the 
statement that the creator of the junior work copied from the original. In that 
sense, our results are profound. While we cannot state this conclusively, there 
is reason to believe that the powerful effect of the knowledge of copying may 
sway decisions on infringement at the margin. We purposefully picked works 
for our comparisons that were neither near-identical nor entirely unrelated 
but rather presented a mix of similarities and differences. The types of work 
pairings likely to go to court rather than be settled or dismissed fall into this 
category as well. While showing that similarity can legally form part of the 
evidence to demonstrate copying, the reverse is not the case. We are observing 
a phenomenon that Barton Beebe has termed “factor stampeding” in the 
trademark context, where decisions about some elements of a multi-factor test 
become excessively dependent on decisions on other elements.75 One could 
argue that for two works that are quite dissimilar, the force of the stampeding 
would be insufficient to sway juries to see the works as substantially similar. 
The number in this subset of cases is likely to be exceedingly small, however, 
as copying itself will be hard to prove if the works are too dissimilar, short of 
the rare cases involving “smoking gun” evidence of copying. 
It is also conceivable that in some cases, the stampeding of similarity 
through copying will not be as dramatic if the similarity already played an 
important role in the determination that copying took place. This may, 
indeed, alleviate the magnitude of the effect we found in this study, but there 
remains a great risk that we have replaced the “substantial similarity” test with 
a “striking similarity” test for the second rather than just the first step of the 
analysis if that is so. In other words, if in some cases striking similarity leads to 
 
 73. See Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 84–85, 93 
(2004). 
 74. Manta, supra note 10, at 1343. 
 75. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1614–22 (2006).  
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a finding of copying, which then—in a non-negligible set of cases at the 
margin—leads to a finding of substantial similarity that would not have been 
found but for the evidence of copying, the striking has replaced the 
substantial. The end result would be a lowered bar for how similar two works 
have to be for infringement to subsist, which represents a shift toward 
plaintiffs that the courts responsible for developing the substantial similarity 
test never anticipated. In any case, our finding that courts are potentially not 
actually doing what they believe themselves to be doing—i.e., specifically 
determining whether substantial similarity is present—is reason enough for 
concern. 
B. LABOR AND FREE-RIDING AS DISTORTIONARY INTUITIONS 
One issue that the first study did not address is—to the extent that 
motivated reasoning explains the results—which aspect of morality-based 
determinations drives subjects to import their perceptions of wrongfulness or 
unfairness into the similarity analysis. Are they concerned about the rights of 
an owner because of the amount of work she put in? Do they fear that the new 
work will supplant the old work in the market? We designed the second study 
to be better able to answer these questions. 
The results of our second study suggest that labor-based considerations 
play an important role in motivating decision-makers’ reasoning on the 
question of similarity. As noted previously, our second study involved giving 
subjects additional information about the amount of effort (measured in 
time) that a creator put into creating the work, then asking them to measure 
the similarity between the original work and the copy. We observed an 
appreciable upward assessment of similarity when subjects were given a strong 
labor condition. When presented with information about market substitution, 
however, subjects displayed no similar variation. 
This suggests that labor continues to play an important intuitive and 
moral role in influencing individuals’ reasoning on the similarity question. 
Unlike in the first study, subjects in the second study were expressly told that 
the similarity assessment was occurring within the context of a copyright 
infringement dispute, and that their assessment of similarity would have a 
direct bearing on the question of liability. This thereby suggests that subjects 
were indeed engaging in a form of motivated reasoning, because they knew 
the consequences of their finding—i.e., that the copier would be found liable 
for copyright infringement. It is plausible that this motivated reasoning was 
shaping their analysis in one of the following two ways. 
In the first, it might have fueled (or indeed triggered) the intuition that 
the greater expenditure of labor ought to correlate to a stronger property 
right or ownership interest. Traditionally associated with Lockean ideals, this 
intuition is thought to map onto people’s beliefs about owning the products 
and fruits of their labor-intensive activities. Some studies suggest that the same 
intuition explains the endowment effect in certain contexts. In our study, it 
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would suggest that the subjects simply associated the creator’s extensive 
expenditure of labor with “stronger protection” for the work, which they then 
translated into a looser standard for similarity, knowing that it would feed 
directly into the assessment of liability. In an equally plausible second 
possibility, the expenditure of labor may not have triggered subjects’ beliefs 
about the strength of the property right, but instead directly affected their 
intuitions about the wrongfulness of the copying. Copying is commonly 
perceived as a form of free-riding. It is therefore conceivable that the creator’s 
expenditure of labor led subjects to view the copying involved as entailing 
greater (and more morally outrageous) free-riding, which they treated as 
wrongful. In a sense then, this interpretation maps on the “reaping without 
sowing” intuition thought to be at stake in misappropriation cases.76 It is, of 
course, also likely that subjects’ reasoning was motivated in part by both 
intuitions. 
Perhaps most importantly, though, if our interpretation of subjects’ 
reasoning is correct, it suggests that copyright law and policy have done a poor 
job of cabining labor-based considerations. In its now notorious decision in 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., the Supreme Court 
categorically concluded that “sweat of the brow” considerations—i.e., that 
“copyright was a reward for . . . hard work”—are largely irrelevant to copyright 
law, especially in determining whether and how much protection works 
obtain.77 While this may be true as a formal matter, our study suggests that 
decision-makers have a tendency to re-introduce these labor-based 
considerations during their assessment of similarity as part of the copyright 
infringement analysis. Our study suggests that instead of claiming to have 
labor-based considerations play no part whatsoever in its working, copyright 
law should make a more concerted effort to eliminate such considerations 
from the different elements of the analysis. Alternatively, the law could 
embrace the reality that moral intuitions relating to labor and free-riding 
directly influence the assessment of similarity, which in turn serves as a simple 
proxy for wrongfulness. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial similarity plays an important role in copyright adjudication. 
It allows courts to tailor the precise scope of the copyright owner’s rights by 
determining the amount of copying that the owner should be able to restrict 
through the law’s framework of exclusive rights. Brought into existence in the 
mid-nineteenth century, it is today an essential component of almost all 
copyright infringement actions that do not involve outright copying by a 
 
 76. See Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law 
of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595 (1942) (detailing this intuition and its role in the hot 
news misappropriation doctrine). 
 77. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). 
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defendant. Copyright law treats it as a simple factual question, premised on a 
similarity comparison of the two works, in the rather naïve belief that lay 
decision-makers (i.e., juries) can cabin the question of similarity from other 
intuitions that are routinely at play in copyright infringement cases. Our 
studies show that copyright law is indeed fundamentally misguided in its 
treatment of the similarity question as being only about the two works at issue. 
Our first study reveals that basic knowledge about the act of copying, 
meaning that one work was copied from the other, greatly influences 
individuals’ assessments of similarity. And since substantial similarity is 
presented as a question to the jury once copying as a factual matter is shown 
to exist, the substantial similarity question is structurally skewed in favor of a 
jury’s finding greater—i.e., substantial—similarity between the two works. 
Our second study shows that in addition to simple knowledge about the 
copying, additional information about the creator’s efforts in producing the 
work also triggers individuals’ intuitions that cause them to find a greater 
amount of similarity between two works. In some ways, this finding is perhaps 
more troubling for copyright law because it suggests that juries, who are the 
decision-makers on the similarity question, are likely introducing variables 
into the analysis and comparison that copyright law’s devices have over the 
years worked hard to eliminate from consideration altogether. A creator’s 
labor or effort is one such prominent consideration, which copyright 
jurisprudence in the United States has uniformly jettisoned as irrelevant. 
What is perhaps additionally problematic about the finding that decision-
makers are influenced by “sweat of the brow” type considerations is the reality 
that this influence is very likely unknown even to them, since it operates at the 
level of intuition. Our study therefore suggests the rather distinct possibility 
that there might indeed be additional such influences at play in subjects’ 
similarity comparisons, most of which ought to be kept out of the copyright 
system altogether. These might include extra information about the market 
positions of the plaintiff and defendant, a defendant’s bad faith intentions, a 
defendant’s attempt to conceal its copying, the plaintiff’s personal affinity (or 
personalization) of the work, and the like. We hope that future studies will 
explore the full extent to which these influences cloud the similarity analysis 
and perhaps cause courts and law-makers to re-evaluate their simplistic 
treatment of substantial similarity as a question of fact. 
At a purely theoretical level, though, our study leads us to conclude that 
while it may be true as a matter of theory that liability for copyright 
infringement is indeed “strict,” in practice this is perhaps largely untrue. Strict 
liability is conceived of today as a form of liability that is insensitive to either 
the defendant’s wrongdoing and fault or to the consequences and harm that 
flow from the defendant’s actions.78 Our study suggests that neither 
assumption may necessarily hold true in practice, since decision-makers are 
 
 78. See Balganesh, supra note 61, at 1682 (describing copyright’s structure as a strict liability tort). 
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indeed “judging” the defendant’s actions in assessing similarity. Given this 
reality, it is perhaps time for copyright law to reconsider its dogmatic 
adherence to a model of strict liability—in both theory and practice. 
